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ABSTRACT
In August 1990, Saddam Hussein’s army invaded Kuwait 
and consequently the United Nations imposed economic 
sanctions on Iraq. In 1991, an international military alliance 
expelled the Iraqi army from Kuwait during a short war. 
Nevertheless, the economic sanctions remained in place—
their removal required that Iraq should destroy its weapons 
of mass destruction. Subsequent years saw reports of 
acute suffering in Iraq. The sanctions undoubtedly greatly 
reduced the country’s ability to import supplies of food 
and medicine. Particular concerns arose about the state 
of young children. These concerns crystalised in 1999 
when, with cooperation from the Iraqi government, Unicef 
conducted a major demographic survey. The results of 
the survey indicated that the under-5 death rate in Iraq 
had increased hugely between 1990 and 1991 and had 
then continued at a very high level. The survey results 
were used both to challenge and support the case for the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. And they were cited by Tony Blair 
in 2010 in his testimony to the Iraq Inquiry established by 
the British government. Indeed, the results of the 1999 
Unicef/Government of Iraq survey are still cited. Since 
2003, however, several more surveys dealing with child 
mortality have been undertaken. Their results show no 
sign of a huge and enduring rise in the under-5 death rate 
starting in 1991. It is therefore clear that Saddam Hussein’s 
government successfully manipulated the 1999 survey in 
order to convey a very false impression—something that is 
surely deserving of greater recognition.
InTRoduCTIon
It is sometimes said that we live in a world of 
‘post-fact’ politics—a world in which the truth 
is always trying to keep up with disinformation. 
In this context, the present article addresses the 
creation of a remarkable fiction—in particular 
that, following the imposition of strict economic 
sanctions on Iraq by the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council in 1990, the country’s child 
(ie, under-5) mortality rate almost doubled 
and subsequently remained at a very high level. 
The deception was manufactured by the then 
government of Iraq led by Saddam Hussein. 
Its purpose was to shake international opinion 
so that the UN economic sanctions would be 
lifted. Following its creation and dissemination 
the deception received considerable attention 
and was widely believed to be true. Moreover, 
it continues to be influential. Yet, as this article 
documents, in the period since the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 there has been an accumulation of 
evidence that has exposed the fiction. Unfortu-
nately, however, the more mundane truth that 
has emerged has received much less attention 
than the original spectacular lie.
BACkgRound
Saddam Hussein became president of Iraq 
in 1979. He then launched an attack on Iran 
which led to the major 1980–1988 Iran/Iraq 
war. At the end of this conflict Iraq was deeply 
in debt, and this was one factor behind Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.1
The invasion of Kuwait by Saddam 
Hussein’s army immediately led to the impo-
sition of stringent economic sanctions on Iraq 
by the UN Security Council. Because Iraq 
imported roughly 70% of its food supplies, 
the government responded very quickly 
by instigating a system of household food 
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key questions
What is already known about this topic?
 ► It is widely believed that child mortality in Iraq during 
1991-2003 was unusually high compared to the 
1980s.
What are the new findings?
 ► Surveys undertaken since 2003 find no evidence of 
unusually high levels of child mortality during 1991-
2003.
 ► The government of Iraq cleverly manipulated survey 
data to fool the international community.
 ► There has been no substantial reduction in child 
mortality in the period since 2003.
 ► Child mortality in Iraq remains about twice the level 
of most neighbouring countries.
Recommendations for policy
 ► Statistics generated in situations conditioned by 
conflict and strong political contestation should 
always be interpreted with great care.
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rationing. Then, during a 6-week war early in 1991, a 
military alliance led by the USA ejected the Iraqi army 
from Kuwait. Saddam Hussein’s regime faced two major 
uprisings, however. A rebellion of Shiites in the south of 
Iraq was crushed. But an uprising of Kurds in the north 
proved more successful. As a result, in September 1992 
Saddam withdrew his army from three northern gover-
norates—containing 15%–20% of Iraq’s people—which 
then became an autonomous Kurdish area. Neverthe-
less, the UN economic sanctions stayed in place for the 
80%–85% of people who lived in the centre and south 
which continued to be under the government’s control.
The 1990s saw increasing international concern about 
the extremely harsh living conditions that were being 
endured by Iraq’s people—especially those living in the 
centre and south. The country’s infrastructure had been 
badly damaged by aerial bombing during the 6-week war, 
and among other things this seriously affected the provi-
sion of supplies of clean water, electricity and also sewage 
disposal. On top of this, the economic sanctions greatly 
restricted Iraq’s ability to export oil so that it could 
pay for important imports—especially of food, but also 
of medicine. As the 1990s progressed, it was clear that 
many aspects of life were being seriously affected by the 
continuing UN economic sanctions.
InITIAl STudIeS of ChIld moRTAlITy
Reports and letters in prominent medical journals were 
influential in shaping international opinion about the 
circumstances in Iraq. Thus, soon after the war in early 
1991 a group of researchers based in the USA made a 
rapid assessment of children’s health and health services 
and found ‘suffering of tragic proportions.’2 A little later, 
another set of researchers known as the International 
Study Team (IST) conducted a nationally representative 
household survey of child mortality. The survey was held 
during a 2-week period in late 1991 and asked questions 
about births that had occurred to women after 1 January 
1985. The analysis of the data was based on a total of 
16 076 live births and 768 deaths. On this basis, the IST 
estimated that the under-5 mortality rate (U5MR) in the 
5 years before 1 January 1991 was about 43 child deaths 
per 1000 live births, and that in the ensuing 8 months 
to 31 August 1991 it was around 128 per 1000. The IST 
estimated that during these 8 months—a period which, 
in addition to the economic sanctions, the country was 
affected by the war, aerial bombing, internal rebellions 
and mass migration—there were 46 900 excess child 
deaths compared with what would have occurred had 
mortality stayed at the level indicated for 1985–1990.3 The 
greatest increase in U5MR was recorded in the Kurdish 
north. The IST acknowledged sources of potential bias in 
the survey, in particular the missing date of death for a 
substantial proportion of children and the possible omis-
sion of deaths occurring before 1990.
With the sanctions continuing, in 1995 a letter reported 
the results of a small survey conducted in Baghdad in that 
year under the auspices of the UN’s Food and Agricul-
ture Organization (FAO), in cooperation with Saddam 
Hussein’s government which provided the field staff. 
The FAO survey interviewed households that had been 
included in the IST survey in 1991. The U5MRs reported 
in the letter also suggested that there had been a huge 
rise in child mortality—from 33 child deaths per 1000 
births before the sanctions to around 245 per 1000 after-
wards. The authors hazarded an estimate of 567 000 
child deaths as a consequence of the sanctions.4 This 
figure attracted attention and influenced international 
opinion.5 However, a second letter published in 1997 
from one of the first letter’s authors was more cautious. 
It told of return visits made to Baghdad in 1996 and 
1997 during which women who in 1995 had reported 
child deaths were reinterviewed. During these return 
visits, each interview team had an international super-
visor and a Jordanian interviewer in addition to the field 
staff supplied by the Iraqi government. Significantly, 
many of the deaths were not confirmed in the reinter-
views. Moreover, it emerged that some miscarriages and 
stillbirths had been wrongly classified as child deaths in 
1995.6 However, these important points of qualification 
received relatively little attention.5
Meanwhile there was mounting debate in international 
circles as to who was responsible for the misery in Iraq. 
Some commentators blamed the government of Saddam 
Hussein. However, other observers attributed responsi-
bility to countries like the USA and the UK which most 
supported maintaining the economic sanctions. One 
result of the debate was that in April 1995 the UN Secu-
rity Council passed the first of several resolutions aimed 
at improving conditions in Iraq by permitting the sale of 
oil so that food and medicine could be imported. This 
became known as the Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP). 
But the negotiations with Saddam Hussein’s govern-
ment to implement the OFFP were very slow. Eventually, 
however, one close observer of the situation was able 
to comment that ‘[s]ince March 1998 the oil for food 
programme has greatly increased access to essential 
supplies and the mortality rate [of children under 5] has 
surely declined.’7
The IRAq ChIld And mATeRnAl moRTAlITy SuRvey
In February to May 1999, Unicef was allowed to conduct 
a major national survey focused on child mortality. 
This was the Iraq Child and Maternal Mortality Survey 
(ICMMS). The ICMMS was similar to household surveys 
that have been undertaken in many countries. However, 
because of the political situation in Iraq it was conducted 
concurrently as two parallel surveys. Thus, in the auton-
omous Kurdish north the ICMMS was supervised directly 
by Unicef. But in the centre and south, Unicef conducted 
the ICMMS in cooperation with Saddam Hussein’s 
government.
Whereas the earlier IST and FAO surveys had been 
quite limited in various respects—for example, in terms 
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Figure 1 Annual estimates of the child mortality rate 
in Iraq from four retrospective surveys (under-5 deaths 
per 1000 live births), 1974–2010. ICMMS, Iraq Child and 
Maternal Mortality Survey; ILCS, Iraq Living Conditions 
Survey; MICS, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey.
of their sample sizes and time depth—the ICMMS repre-
sented a significant advance. For example, the sample was 
large, being about 14 000 households in the north and 
24 000 in the centre/south. Also, the ICMMS focused on 
child mortality—with little other information being gath-
ered. In the centre and south, the government of Iraq 
provided the field staff from the health sector. The inter-
viewers, all women, were either junior doctors or recent 
medical graduates, and considerable effort was made to 
train them. The ICMMS questionnaire was comparable 
to that used in other countries, and it was pretested care-
fully. Full, rather than truncated, birth histories were 
collected from ever-married women aged 15–49. Lastly, 
Unicef established an independent panel of experts to 
assess the ICMMS survey procedures and data quality. 
The panel identified no problems.8
In August 1999, Unicef released the preliminary find-
ings of the ICMMS with considerable publicity. The 
survey results indicated that children in the centre/
south of Iraq were dying at over twice the rate of 10 
years earlier. Unicef’s Executive Director noted that 
there was an ongoing humanitarian emergency in the 
country and that there would have been 500 000 fewer 
child deaths during 1991–1998 had the fall in mortality 
of the 1980s continued throughout 1991–1998. Concern 
was understandably expressed that whenever economic 
sanctions are imposed on a country they should be 
designed and executed so that they do not have a nega-
tive impact on children.9
In 2000, an article titled ‘Sanctions and childhood 
mortality in Iraq’ presented a detailed analysis of the 
ICMMS data. The article contained estimates of child 
mortality by 5-year periods. The authors estimated that 
between 1984–1989 and 1994–1999, the U5MR rose 
from 56 to 131 deaths per 1000.8 A subsequent article 
provided annual estimates.10 For the centre/south, 
the results indicated a rise in the U5MR from 59 to 
116 per 1000 between 1990 and 1991, with a further 
increase to 142 per 1000 by 1998. For the north, the 
U5MR rose from 72 to 128 per 1000 between 1987 and 
1991. With its onset well before 1991, however, this rise 
mainly reflected Saddam Hussein’s persecution of the 
Kurds—recall in this context that the poison gas attack 
on the Kurdish town of Halabja took place in 1988. In 
the north, with the Iraqi army withdrawn, the ICMMS 
results suggested that the U5MR fell back sharply to 68 
per 1000 in 1993.
The ICMMS results for the centre/south of Iraq 
indicating that there was a huge rise in child mortality 
between 1990 and 1991 and sustained high mortality 
thereafter were generally thought to be reliable and 
were widely cited. The results were used to warn against 
the potentially disastrous consequences of the US/UK 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.11 And they were also used as 
justification for that invasion by its proponents. Thus, 
giving evidence to the Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir 
John Chilcot, Tony Blair stated in 2010 that during 
2000–2002 (ie, before the invasion) those living under 
Saddam Hussein’s regime ‘had a child mortality rate of 
130 per 1000 children under the age of five … That 
equates to roughly about 90 000 deaths under the age 
of five a year. The figure today is not 130, it is 40 … 
that’s the result that getting rid of Saddam makes.’12
It is now known, however, that the ICMMS results 
for the centre/south of Iraq were a deception.5 13 But 
this fact has received virtually no publicity or attention. 
Unicef has neither acknowledged the error nor made 
the ICMMS data publicly available. Indeed, the article 
containing the detailed analysis of the ICMMS estimates 
by 5-year periods, and its conclusion that there was a 
sharp rise in mortality due to the sanctions, remain 
widely cited.14–22 Yet the UN unobtrusively changed its 
own U5MR estimates in 2009.23 24 We now consider how 
the deception was revealed.
unCoveRIng The deCepTIon
Following the US/UK invasion of Iraq in March 2003, 
there was concern in the coalition’s military occupation 
authorities to assemble information on Iraq’s popula-
tion. In this context, it became known that a census had 
been undertaken in the centre and south of Iraq in 1997. 
Moreover, the census had included some very basic ques-
tions on child mortality. A copy of the census report was 
unearthed and forwarded to the US Census Bureau in 
Washington, DC. And, significantly, an article published 
in the New York Times in August 2003 quoted a Census 
Bureau official as stating that ‘it looks like child mortality 
may not have been quite as high during the mid-to-late 
1990s as has been thought.’25
Then, in 2005, the report of a Working Group of an 
Independent Inquiry Committee established by the 
Secretary General of the UN to investigate the OFFP was 
published. This report contained an analysis of the child 
mortality data from the 1997 census.26 The data suffered 
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Figure 2 United Nations estimates of the child mortality 
rate in Iraq and neighbouring countries by 5-year periods, 
1970–2015.
from serious errors and limitations. Nevertheless, and to 
some surprise, the Working Group questioned whether 
there had been a huge rise in child mortality around 
1991 as was indicated by the IST and, more especially, 
the ICMMS. The Working Group suggested that the Iraqi 
government might have tampered with the ICMMS data. 
These ideas were rejected by those who saw no reason 
to question the ICMMS child mortality estimates on the 
basis of the 1997 census data.27 28
However, since 2003 three major household surveys 
covering the whole of Iraq and collecting full birth histo-
ries from adult women have been conducted. The first 
survey was the 2004 Iraq Living Conditions Survey (ILCS). 
The ILCS was funded by the United Nations Development 
Programme and organised with Norwegian technical 
assistance. The main purpose of the ILCS was to provide 
general socioeconomic data. But it also collected birth 
histories from women in 21000 Iraqi households. When 
the birth history data began to arrive from the field, the 
organisers of the survey decided that child deaths were 
being greatly under-reported. Accordingly, they resolved 
‘to re-interview all households again with (a) small ques-
tionnaire’ containing the birth history.29 Nevertheless, the 
U5MRs for 1999–2003 obtained from the reinterviews were 
still surprisingly low. Indeed, in its report of 2005, even the 
Working Group of the Independent Inquiry Committee 
largely dismissed the ILCS results.
The second major survey was the 2006 Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS).30 This entailed collabo-
ration between Unicef and Iraq’s Ministry of Health, and 
it collected birth histories from women in 18 000 house-
holds. The third survey was the 2011 MICS. This involved 
a similar collaboration and interviewed women in about 
36 000 households.31 It should be noted that the MICS 
surveys developed by Unicef have been used in over 60 
countries to provide key indicators relating to the state of 
young children.
With this as background, figure 1 compares the U5MRs 
calculated from the ICMMS of 1999, the ILCS of 2004, 
and the MICS surveys of 2006 and 2011. It shows that, in 
contrast to the ICMMS, the U5MRs from the three recent 
surveys reveal no sign of a huge rise in child mortality 
after 1990. This is compelling evidence that it simply did 
not happen. In short, as suggested with notable intu-
ition by the Working Group of the Independent Inquiry 
Committee in 2005, the ICMMS data were evidently 
rigged to show a huge and sustained—and largely 
non-existent—rise in child mortality. The falsification 
might have occurred during the data entry stage at the 
behest of the Iraqi government. However, recall that the 
government provided the field staff for the ICMMS in the 
centre and south, so it may be that  under the strong-arm 
influence of government authorities the deception 
happened during the fieldwork stage (as seems to have 
occurred during the much smaller 1995 FAO survey in 
Baghdad). The objective of Saddam Hussein’s govern-
ment was to heighten international concern and so get 
the economic sanctions ended.
That is not to say that there was no rise at all in the 
U5MR in Iraq between 1990 and 1991. All three major 
surveys conducted since 2003 suggest that there was a 
slight increase. Moreover, recall the substantial rise indi-
cated by the ICMMS for the period 1988–1992 in the 
north—reflecting the oppression of the Kurds. In this 
context, the rise indicated for January to August 1991 
by the modest IST survey was also much greater in the 
north. That said, for Iraq as a whole the IST survey prob-
ably understated the level of child mortality that prevailed 
during 1985–1990 and overstated the level during 1991.
If we ignore the—false—U5MRs for 1991–1998 from 
the ICMMS in figure 1, and take account of the fact that 
older women are more likely to under-report child deaths 
(indicated most clearly in figure 1 by the U5MRs from the 
ILCS for the 1980s) then a significant degree of agree-
ment actually emerges. The three surveys conducted 
since 2003 all put the U5MR in Iraq during 1995–2000 
in the vicinity of 40 per 1000. In relation to the difficult 
conditions of the 1990s, it should be noted that Saddam 
Hussein’s government became increasingly proficient 
at evading the sanctions and Iraq’s basic food rationing 
system probably also helped the situation.
Lastly, for 1970–2015 figure 2 plots the UN’s latest 
U5MR estimates by 5-year periods for Iraq and neigh-
bouring countries.32 The estimates for Iraq are based 
mainly on the 2004, 2006 and 2011 surveys we have 
discussed, with consideration of the ICMMS results 
for before 1990. In the 1970s, there was considerable 
variation in child mortality, the trend in Iraq broadly 
paralleling the trends in Syria and Jordan. From the early 
1980s onwards, however, progress in Iraq seems to have 
been much slower. Indeed, by 2010–2015 the U5MR in 
Iraq was roughly twice that of the other countries. The 
period of miserable progress in reducing child mortality 
broadly corresponds to the period of Saddam Hussein. 
He brought a host of troubles and disasters to his country 
of which, however evaluated, the economic sanctions 
constituted a very small part.
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ConCluSIon
The purpose of this article has been to discuss a major 
deception. In part, the deception gained credence 
in the international community because it fitted with 
the widespread view that the UN’s economic sanctions 
were wrong. That said, there was no major rise in child 
mortality in Iraq after 1990 and during the period of the 
sanctions. Conversely, there was no major improvement 
in child mortality after the downfall of Saddam Hussein. 
In this context, a rare instance in which the fact of the 
deception has been twigged appears in the Iraq Inquiry 
report published in 2016. With reference to Tony Blair’s 
statement about the level of child mortality prevailing 
before 2003, and its subsequent major decline, Sir John 
Chilcot and his colleagues clearly decided that the rates 
for before 2003, based on the ICMMS, were greatly 
inflated.33 34
In conclusion, the rigging of the 1999 Unicef survey 
was an especially masterful fraud. That it was a decep-
tion is beyond doubt, although it is still not generally 
known. However, when the UN realised its mistake it led 
to a sudden and large upward revision of its estimate of 
life expectation in Iraq during 2000–2005, from 57 to 70 
years.23 24
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